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Abstract
This note offers two comments on the article “Social Influences towards
Conformism in Economic Experiments” by Hargreaves Heap that is to appear
in the Economics e-Journal. One relates to the concept of conformism, the
other lines out some phenomena where an explicit recognition of group
processes, such as conformism, may be analytically helpful.
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1 The Concept
The experimental literature in economics super-abounds with a wealth of effects and
behavioral tendencies. Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) mention reciprocity, inequity
aversion, altruism, and envy as important “social preferences.” The laboratory
experiments surveyed by Shaun Hargreaves Heap (2014) suggest strongly that we
ought to add conformism to that list.
Each of these phenomena is important in its own right, is empirically relevant,
and also, for decades, well known in social psychology. Yet there remains a
problem with integrating these phenomena into economics. This problem is similar
to a problem that David Hume saw in approaches to moral philosophy that he was
criticizing at the time:
To invent without scruple a new principle to every new phaenomenon,
instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses with a
variety of this kind; are certain proofs, that none of these principles is
the just one, and that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to
cover our ignorance of the truth (Hume, 2003, ii,i,iii).
It is, of course, easy to postulate a preference for conformity, write a measure that
gives the distance of actions across different individuals as a discommodity in the
utility function and maintain that conformism, so conceived, “can be taken as a
primitive by the economist” (Jones (1984, 14); Shaun Hargreaves Heap remains
more guarded in this respect.) Yet the idea that a desire for conformity is a useful
analytical primitive appears to me quite questionable. Sometimes the opposite
happens. The escalating brutality observed in Zimbardo’s (1999) Stanford Prison
Experiment was certainly not a matter of conformism; rather it offers a nice
example of what is known as group polarization (Wetherell, 1987). Turner’s (1987)
self-categorization approach, for example, would cover both the convergence of
attitudes and actions within a group, and group polarization, but the convergence
of attitudes would occur not out of a “preference for conformity” but rather to
establish a social identity on part of the actors. In this, Turner’s view provides a
better starting point for economic analysis than the simple postulate of a genetically
or socially programmed herd instinct. Such a line of argument would also be more
in line with Asch’s interpretation of his own experiment that does not run in terms
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of a preference for conformity at all, but emphasizes the desire by the subjects to
resolve the tension between two conflicting cognitions in a right way. Re-reading
chapter 16 of Asch’s (1987) “Social Psychology” will clarify this. I may add that
Solomon Asch conveyed to me personally that he was quite unhappy with the
widespread interpretation of his experiments in terms of blind conformism.1
It may be of interest to some readers that the view of group processes proposed
by Asch and Turner can be developed for purposes of economics to cover not only
conformity, but also reciprocity, ownership effects, or phenomena of obedience and
authority. I have tried to explain this elsewhere (Schlicht, 1998). These phenomena
rest, in my view, entirely on entitlements and obligations, as perceived by the
actors, and emerge from the situation, and not from preferences. I would therefore
refuse to assume any primitive “social preference.” To illustrate this criticism, take
for instance the idea of “inequity aversion.” While such a preference for equality
can be postulated and may be seen as rationalizing many forms of behavior, it
is flatly rejected empirically once entitlements and obligations are manipulated
(Gächter and Riedl, 2005).
In spite of these conceptual problems, the studies surveyed by Hargreaves
Heap are extremely important for helping to correct some central assumptions that
dominate present-day economics. The view that preferences are formed socially,
and that custom and fashion are important determinants of behavior is anathema
here, but has always been a constitutive element of classical economics. As Adam
Smith explains:
Bring [man] into society, and all his own passions will immediately
become the causes of new passions. He will observe that mankind
approve of some of them, and are disgusted by others. He will be
elevated in the one case, and cast down in the other; his desires and
aversions, his joys and sorrows, will now often become the causes
of new desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows: they
1 As an aside, I am inclined to question the assertion that Asch’s experiments were motivated in
part by the experience of conformism under fascism. While this may be true for Milgram’s (2009)
authority experiments, Asch’s experiments were, as far as I know, conceived as modifications of
Sherif’s experiments on group judgements about the autokinetic effect, see Asch (1987, 484-494).
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will now, therefore, interest him deeply, and often call upon his most
attentive consideration (Smith, 2009, ii.1.3).
This conception of man differs considerably from the solipsistic view cultivated
to-day. The studies in experimental economics make it perfectly clear that the
contemporary view is profoundly unrealistic. One could counter this objection, in
a Friedmanian vein, by asserting that homo oeconomicus is merely an analytical
device, an as if construct that is expressedly not meant to be realistic, but only
designed in order to deliver good predictions. For this purpose the behavioral
tendencies examined in experimental economics are irrelevant, as we can simply
neglect these “complications” and stick to our as if assumptions. But then we
should be aware that the welfare conclusions we draw from such as if theories
relate to the welfare of imagined beings – implications for as if welfare, so to
speak – and not to the welfare of real persons, or groups of real persons. This is
often overlooked. Lucas (1987, Ch. iv), with his estimation of the welfare losses
induced by business cycles for the fictional representative household provides a
clear example for this line of unacceptable argument. Experimental economics
reminds us about this mistake.
2 Entailments
Disregarding the conceptional problems mentioned above, we may just assume
that, in certain settings, the grouping of individuals induces convergent behavior
among the group members and analyze the consequences of such a behavioral
tendency.
One set of consequences relates to social comparison. The productivity effects
of social comparison in work groups that Hartgraves Heap discusses are actually
used by firms to establish good working traditions. Stephen Jones (1984, 78-80)
illustrates this beautifully. He details the strategies that the automobile manufac-
turer Nissan employed when setting up a plant in Smyrna, Tennessee: Nissan
selected a small group of workers as a core labor force carefully and trained them
in Japan over considerable time and at considerable expense. The hope was that
new employees that were successively added to the core labor force would emulate
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the good working tradition inculcated in the core group. Such strategies are not
uncommon, and the experiments about conformism help us to better understand
such practices.
Further, the tendency of workers to adjust to working standards and working
habits of the group actually renders economic incentives more powerful for the
group as a whole. Even if individual performance is mainly governed by group
standards and stronger economic incentives increase individual productivity only
marginally, the induced marginal increase in group performance will feed back
on the individuals, and so forth. In this way, reference group behavior induces
a “social multiplier” chain that eventually augments, rather than attenuates, the
effectiveness of economic incentives (Schlicht, 1981). Economic considerations
may become even more relevant in such a setting.
The idea that individuals conform to group standards and are influenced by the
behavior prevailing in their reference group has proven fruitful in several economic
investigations, but usually economists are hostile to such endeavors. Consider
James Duesenberry (1949, 26) who observed:
Thirty years ago the average urban family with a $1500 income in
1940 prices saved 8 per cent of its income. In 1941, a similarly placed
family saved nothing.
To cope with this (and some other) empirical observations, he proposed his relative
income hypothesis. It posits that the households’ consumption is influenced by the
consumption patterns prevailing around them. (Unfortunately, economists were too
easily persuaded by Milton Friedman (1957) that social comparisons are redundant
in the theory of consumer behavior because in 1941, the families with $1500 would
just be suffering a severe negative shocks in transitory income and would enjoy a
much higher permanent income than the corresponding families in 1940. In view
of what Hargreaves Heap writes, I would think that both relative and permanent
income matters.)
Thinking about other implications, I found the ingroup/outgroup effects ana-
lyzed by Hargreaves Heap et al. (2013) and mentioned in the paper particularly
interesting, as the result that outgroups influence the work standards for ingroup
members may help to understand the extremely important influence of local culture
5
on labor productivity that seems to outsize any more narrowly conceived economic
incentive (Clark, 1987).
Many further examples can be thought of that may be better understood by
explicitly acknowledging the influence of the social setting on the individual’s
actions, attitudes and preferences. The importance of historical borders that don’t
exist anymore (Panther 1998, Becker et al. 2011), or the long term effect of a
bygone colonial history (Acemoglu et al., 2001) come to mind. While it seems
always possible to invent some story that accounts for one or the other of such
phenomena in terms of individual utility maximization absent interdependence,
the reality of group processes like those surveyed by Hargreaves Heap suggest
otherwise. It is clear that such a recognition would blast a barrier that is imposed
on the modern economists by their own conception of their social identity, yet
let it be. And let us note that such a move would entail massive consequences
regarding taxation, welfare economics, international economics, and the theory
of the firm. In this sense, it opens a grand field for future research. So I don’t
find it disturbing at all that, in many settings, individual preferences have to be
conceived as interdependent, and I tend to see the reluctance of economists to face
phenomena like conformism as a further manifestation of the tremendous force of
conformism.
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